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Highlights
Issues related to the U.S. sugar industry for the 2000 Round of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) agricultural trade negotiations include further reductions in internal supports and export
subsidies, restricting activities of state trading enterprises, and harmonization of existing regulations on
agricultural biotechnology among countries. These issues are not unique to the U.S. sugar industry but
are fairly common for most agricultural commodities produced in the United States. Issues more
directly related to the U.S. sugar industry are expected changes in U.S. sugar programs and policies,
mainly loan rates and TRQs under the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) and the upcoming WTO
negotiations.
The objective of this study is to analyze major issues the U.S. sugar industry is facing or will
face in the near future and the impacts of alternative trade liberalization policies in the United States and
the European Union (EU) on the U.S. sugar industry. Special attention is given to regional
competitiveness in sugar production in the United States.
A global sugar policy simulation model was used for this study. This study is based on the base
and alternative scenarios. The base scenario is grounded on a series of assumptions about general
economy, agricultural policies, and technological changes in exporting and importing countries. It is
generally assumed that current agricultural policy will be continued in all countries. Average weather
conditions and historical rates of technological change are assumed to prevail during the projection
period. Three alternative scenarios developed in this study are (1) the United States eliminates its
import restrictions on sugar for the 2001 to 2004 period and maintains its trade embargo on Cuba,
while other countries maintain their subsidies and import restricting programs, (2) the United States
eliminates its import restrictions on sugar for the 2001 to 2004 period and allows trade with Cuba,
while other countries maintain their subsidies and import restricting programs, and (3) both the United
States and the EU eliminate import restrictions and subsidies, respectively, for the 2001 to 2004 period,
and other countries maintain their subsidies and import restricting programs. The results from these
alternative scenarios are compared with those from the base scenario to evaluate impacts of the stated
policy changes on the U.S. sugar industry. 
In the base scenario, sugar production in the United States is expected to increase about 4.2 
percent for beet sugar and 3.2 percent for cane sugar during the 2001 to 2004 period. However, sugar
consumption in the United States is expected to increase about 4.4 percent, which is slightly larger than
production. As a result, U.S. imports of sugar are projected to increase 5.4 percent in this time period.
The Caribbean price of sugar is expected to increase 21 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period in the
base scenario. However, the U.S. domestic wholesale price of sugar is expected to increase only 6.1
percent for the same time period. This is mainly because the U.S. government increases its imports to
stabilize the domestic price of sugar. v
Under the U.S. trade liberalization scenario in which the United States eliminates its import
restrictions while other countries maintain their sugar programs, the Caribbean price of sugar is
expected to increase about 36 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period because increased U.S. imports of
sugar raise demand for sugar in the world market. At the same time, the U.S. wholesale price
decreases 28 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period because increased imports raise the supply of sugar
in the United States. U.S. sugar production decreases substantially due to decreased domestic sugar
prices, resulting in increases in sugar imports. When the United States includes Cuba as a trading
partner, the Caribbean price of sugar increases only 32 percent and the U.S. whole sale price
decreases 30.6 percent. This is mainly because Cuba can supply large amounts of sugar to the United
States at shipping costs lower than any other off-shore origins.
When both the United States and the EU liberalize their sugar trade, the Caribbean price of
sugar is expected to increase 68 percent from 9.45 cents per pound in 1999 to 15.86 cents per pound
in 2004. This is mainly because under this scenario, (1) sugar production in the EU decreases
substantially and the EU starts to import sugar and (2) the United States also increases its sugar
imports, resulting in the increased demand for sugar in the world market. The U.S. wholesale price of
sugar decreases only 10 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period under this scenario.
The U.S. sugarbeet industry is more cost efficient than the sugarcane industry. Florida is the
most competitive sugarcane producing region. The Red River Valley is the most competitive in
producing beet sugar. Most sugarbeet producing regions and Florida will remain competitive as a result
of the elimination of the sugar programs in the United States and the EU. However, if only the United
States eliminates its sugar programs, all U.S. sugar producing regions would be threatened.vi
Abstract
The objective of this study is to analyze major issues the U.S. sugar industry is facing or will
face in the near future and the impacts of alternative trade liberalization policies in the United States and
the European Union (EU) on the U.S. sugar industry. Special attention is given to regional
competitiveness in sugar production in the United States. A global sugar policy simulation model was
used for this study.
This study indicates that most sugar producing regions may be able to survive at current costs
and asset values if both the United States and the EU liberalize their sugar trade, while sugar subsidies
remain in other countries. However, if only the United States eliminates its sugar programs, all U.S.
sugar producing regions would be threatened.
Key words:  sugarbeet, sugarcane, loan rates, import liberalization, sugar price, Caribbean sugar
price, high fructose corn syrup  *Koo is director of the Northern Plains Trade Research Center and Professor of Agricultural
Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo.




Less than 30 percent of world sugar production is traded internationally. A substantial share of
this trade takes place under bilateral long-term agreements or preferential terms, such as the U.S. sugar
quota or the European Union’s Lome Convention (Borremans 1999). Only a small proportion of world
sugar is traded freely. Most sugar producing countries use various trade barriers to protect their own
sugar industries and/or use export subsidy programs to increase or maintain their world market shares.
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) for agricultural goods, most countries made
commitments to reduce their subsidies for sugar (WTO 1998). However, the basic structure of
protection for sugar remains unchanged in most countries. A new round of World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations and negotiations for the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA)  both will start in
November 1999. Liberalization of the world sugar industry through the successful conclusions of these
two negotiations would affect the U.S. sugar industry. 
The objective of this study is to analyze major issues the U.S. sugar industry is facing or will
face in the near future and the impacts of alternative trade liberalization policies in the United States and
the European Union (EU) on the U.S. sugar industry. Special attention is given to regional
competitiveness in sugar production in the United States.
 Overview of the World Sugar Industry
Sugar is produced in over 100 countries worldwide. For the 1994–1998 period, global sugar
production was approximately 119 million tons annually with 30 percent of production exported from
its country of origin (USDA-ERS 1999). The largest sugar producing region is the EU, followed by
India and Brazil (Table 1).
Per capita sugar consumption is highest in Cuba (58.97 kg), followed by Brazil and Australia.
Per capita sugar consumption in the United States is 32.66 kg, which is above the world average per
capita consumption (19.96 kg). Per capita sugar consumption is lowest in China at 6.80 kg per capita,
but that may increase substantially as per capita income increases. Global sugar consumption for the
1994–1998 period was 117 million metric tons annually.
The major sugar exporting countries are the EU, Brazil, Australia, Thailand, Cuba, and 
Ukraine. These countries account for 73 percent of global exports from 1990 to 1995 (Table 1).
Relatively few countries dominate world sugar exports, but imports are less concentrated. Major
importing countries are the EU, Russia, China, the United States, Japan, Korea, and Canada. Their
imports accounted for about 46 percent of all sugar imports from 1994 to 1998. Under the Lome
Convention the EU is required to import sugar under preferential terms from certain African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries. Figure 1 shows export-to-production ratios. The ratios fluctuate
widely with a gradual downward trend, indicating that a smaller portion of production was traded in the
global market.2
Table 1.  World Sugar Supply and Utilization, 1995 to 1998 Average
    Country Crop
a Production
 Consumption
Net Exports Ending Stocks
Per Capita
Consumption
-------------------- 1,000 metric tons, raw value ---------------------    pounds
Algeria B 10 917 -902 96 69
Australia C 5,252 884 4,293 221 106
Brazil C 13,256 8,180 5,080 679 114
Canada B 134 1,243 -1,114 160 91
China B/C 7,177 8,209 -1,327 2,560 15
Cuba C 3,970 646 3,300 304 130
Egypt B/C 1,120 1,735 -665 320 63
European Union
(I 2) B 17,562 14,006 3,721 2,395 85
Former Soviet Union
B 5,708 9,755 -3,795 1,714 73
India C 15,037 14,808 -242 6,012 34
Indonesia C 2,226 2,955 -815 537 33
Japan B/C 815 2,489 -1,662 135 44
Mexico C 4,576 4,238 421 630 97
South Africa C 1,958 1,399 552 366 73
South Korea  - 0 1,104 -1,113 134 53
Thailand C 5,176 1,517 3,673 575 56
United States B/C 6,897 8,690 -1,744 1,268 72
Rest of the World B/C 28,950 34,452 -7,662 6,242 40
World Total   119,825 117,228 34,888 24,346  44
a. B = Sugarbeet; C = Sugarcane.
Source:  USDA, PS&D View, 1999.
Figure 2 shows world sugar production and consumption for the 1970 to 1998 period. In most
years total sugar production has been larger than sugar consumption. This has led to  downward
pressure on the world price of sugar.
The Caribbean raw sugar price is usually considered to be the world market price for sugar.
Except for years with high world market prices, there is a substantial wedge between the U.S.
wholesale price of raw sugar and the world market price (USDA-ERS, various issues). Over the last
decade, U.S. wholesale prices fluctuated between $0.25 per pound and $0.29 per pound. World
market prices ranged between $0.09 per pound and $0.13 per pound (Figure 3). Both real Caribbean
raw sugar prices and U.S. raw sugar import prices have long-term downward trends . 
The volatility of world sugar prices could be due to the nature of supply response to price
changes stemming from high fixed costs of sugar production. An increase in sugar production in
response to rising sugar prices requires significant investments in processing facilities, and it takes some
time until new production capacity becomes available. Once the facilities are in place, they tend to be
used at full capacity to spread the fixed costs. Thus, when prices fall, production remains at full
capacity. Sugar production is relatively unresponsive to price in the short run.3



















Figure 1.   World Sugar Exports to Production Ratios
Source:  USDA-ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook, various issues.
Figure 2.  World Sugar Production and Consumption, Raw Sugar Equivalent
Source:  USDA-ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook, various issues.4










Figure 3.  U.S. Sugar and HFCS Price 
Source:  USDA-ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook, various issues.
The United States produces both beet and cane sugar. Cane sugar is produced mainly in
Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Hawaii. Beet sugar is produced largely in the Great Lakes region, Upper
Midwest, Great Plains, and far western states. U.S. total sugar production (Figure 4) increased about
34 percent from 6.1 million tons in 1985/86 to 8.2 million tons in 1998/99 (USDA-ERS, various
issues). Beet sugar production increased 41.3 percent for the 1985 to 1998 period, while cane sugar
production increased  22.7 percent. 
U.S. consumption of sugar also increased 22 percent from 8.1 million tons in 1985/86 to 9.8
million tons in 1997/98. The balance was imported from more than forty countries (Figure 5). U.S.
sugar imports were reduced 71 percent from 4.5 million tons to 1.3 million tons for the 1974 to 1987
period and then increased to 2.1 million tons for the 1988 to 1998 period. 
Figure 6 shows market shares of different sweeteners in the United States. Sugar produced in
the United States accounted for about 40 percent of total domestic sweetener consumption during the
1985 to 1998 period. Market share of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) was less than 10 percent of
the domestic sweetener consumption in 1974, and increased to about 40 percent for the last 25 years.
On the other hand, market share of imported sugar decreased substantially for the period. This clearly
implies that production of HFCS did not affect production of sugar in the United States, but did affect

























































































Figure 4. U.S. Production of Beet and Cane Sugar, 1974 to 1998
Source:  USDA-ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook, various issues.
Figure 5.  U.S. Sugar Production and Consumption
Source:  USDA-ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook, various issues.6







Non-caloric Production HFCS Production
Sugar Imports Domestic Production
Figure 6.  Market Share for Sweeteners in the United States
Source:  USDA-ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook, various issues.
Sugar Program and Policies in the United States and Other Countries
Sugar programs and policies differ among countries. Table 2 shows major policies used by
major sugar producing regions and countries.
The U.S. Sugar Program and Policies
The U.S. sugar program was established by the Food and Agricultural Act of 1981. Several
modifications have been made by the Food Security Act of 1985, the Food, Agriculture, Conservation,
and Trade Act of 1990, and the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996. 
The core policy tools in the program are the loan program and import restrictions (Lord 1996).
The main purpose of the loan program is to maintain a minimum market price to U.S. producers.
Processors use sugar as collateral for loans from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The
program permits processors to store the sugar rather than sell it for lower than desired prices. Loans
can be taken up to nine months. Processors pay growers for delivered beets and cane, typically about
60 percent of the loan. The final payments are made, and the loan is repaid after the sugar has been
sold.7
Table 2.  Policies and Practices Affecting Sugar Trade
Countries Practice/Policy
United States Loan program, TRQ
EU, South Africa, Mexico Internal support, export subsidies
Australia, Brazil, China, India State trading enterprises (STEs)
Developing Countries High tariffs, lower labor costs and standards, weak
environmental standards
Non-WTO Members Independence from WTO rules on market access,
internal support, and export subsidies
Source:  U.S. GAO, Sugar Program:  Changing the Method for Setting Import Quotas Could
              Reduce Cost to Users, GAO/RCED-99-209, 1999.
Under the FAIR Act, the sugar loan rate is set at 18 cents per pound for raw cane sugar and
22.9 cents per pound for refined beet sugar. Loans under the FAIR Act become recourse loans if the
tariff rate quota (TRQ) is at 1.5 million tons or below, regardless of the price. When the TRQ is set
above 1.5 million tons, the loans are nonrecourse. Under the nonrecourse loan, a processor forfeits
collateral (sugar) to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) if market prices fall below the loan
rates. The processor must pay a penalty of about one cent per pound of sugar, effectively reducing the
price support by the same.
Under the FAIR Act, the secretary of agriculture can reduce the U.S. sugar loan rates if major
sugar producing and  exporting countries reduce their export and domestic subsidies for sugar more
than already agreed upon in the URA. The new U.S. rates must be at least as high as the level of
support in other countries.
Processors who obtain a nonrecourse loan must pay farmers an amount for their sugarbeets and
sugarcane that is proportional to the loan value of sugar. The USDA is authorized to establish minimum
sugarbeet and sugarcane prices that processors must pay to growers. This is the same as under
previous legislation. 
The marketing assessment fee was raised by 25 percent in the FAIR Act. Beginning with fiscal
year 1997, sellers of domestic sugar must pay an assessment of about one-quarter cent per pound.
The FAIR Act did not change the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States established
under the URA on agriculture. This implies that sugar imports are subject to two-tier tariff schedules
under the TRQ.
The 1985 Food Security Act included a provision mandating the president to use all available
authorities to operate the sugar program established under Section 206 of the Agriculture Act of 1949
at no cost to the federal government. However, Section 206 of the 1949 act was repealed by Section8
701 of the 1996 FAIR Act, implying that the no-cost provision is no longer effective in the current
sugar program.
The URA on agriculture made minor adjustments for sugar trade. U.S. import quotas on sugar
were converted into TRQs, implying that a specified amount of sugar can be imported at the lower of
two alternative duty rates. The amount of raw cane sugar subject to the lower duty rate must be no less
than 1,117,195 metric tons in a fiscal year (Lord 1996). The minimum low-duty imports of refined
sugar is 22,000 metric tons. The minimum low-duty imports for raw and refined sugar add up to 1.256
million short tons raw value of sugar per year. The high duty (about 17.62 cents per pound) is imposed
on the amount of sugar imported over the import quota. The first-tier duty ranges from zero to 0.625
cents per pound.
The second-tier duty for raw cane sugar will be reduced from 17.62 cents per pound in 1995 to
15.82 cents per pound in 2000 under the URA. The duty for refined sugar will be reduced from 18.6
cents per pound in 1995 to 16.21 cents per pound in 2000. The quota will remain at the same level for
the 1995 to 2000 period.
The sugar quota has been allocated among more than 40 quota-holding countries, allowing
imports of specific quantities of sugar at first-tier duty rates. The quota allocation is based on historical
exports to the United States for the 1975 to 1985 period.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allows a rapid reduction in the second-
tier duty for Mexican sugar over the next several years. The second-tier duty for Mexican sugar will be
reduced from 16.11 cents per pound in 1995 to zero in 2008. Duties for most countries will remain at
15.36 cents for raw cane sugar and 16.21 cents for refined sugar (Henneberry and Haley 1998). This
implies that Mexico is in a unique position to increase its exports of sugar to the United States above
the allocated quota. Mexico produced 5.1 million metric tons of sugar in 1998 and consumed 4.24
million metric tons in the same year. Its exports were 0.87 million metric tons in 1998. If Mexico starts
to use HFCS for beverages, more of its sugar could be exported to the United States. 
Domestic and Export Subsidies in the EU, South Africa, and Mexico
The basic tools of the EU’s sugar policies are (1) import restrictions with limited free access for
certain suppliers; (2) internal support prices that ensure returns to producers for fixed quantities of
production and permit the maintenance of refining capacity; and (3) export subsidies for a quantity of
domestically produced sugar (Borremans 1999).
EU member states allocate an “A” quota and a “B” quota to each sugar producing operation,
each isoglucose producing operation, and each inulin syrup producing operation established in their
territory. Current quota levels have been placed since the accession of Austria, Sweden, and Finland to
the EU and are currently legislated at these levels until 2000/01.  The total EU sugar production quotas
for A and B sugar are 11.98 million and 2.61 million, respectively. Any sugar that is produced by any
member of the EU that is in excess of its yearly quota is considered “C-sugar.” A and B sugar
production is used for domestic consumption and for subsidized exports. C-sugar must be exported9
into the world market without subsidy or carried over into the next marketing year. In general, the EU’s
target price for white sugar is about 30 cents (Euro) per pound, and its intervention price is 28.72 cents
(Euro). The export subsidy was 20.0 cents (Euro) per pound for the 1995 to 1998 period. The EU’s
internal support is about 30 percent higher than that in the United States.
Since marketing year 1995, EU subsidized exports of sugar to third world countries have been
limited, in volume and value, under the Uruguay Round commitments of the EU. However, the EU did
not make an export subsidy commitment on its subsidized exports of a quantity of sugar equal to its
preferential imports under the Lome Convention (Borremans 1999; Steel 1999). 
South Africa has both internal price supports and export subsidies. South Africa is reducing its
quantity of subsidized exports by 200,000 tons to 702,208 tons by the year 2000 under the URA
(Steel 1999). Mexico also has subsidized exports and is subsidizing raw sugar storage (Steel 1999).
State Trading Enterprises in Australia, China, and India
Australia’s sugar exports are handled by the Queensland Sugar Corporation (QSC), a statutory
authority established under the Sugar Industry Act 1991 (Boston Consulting Group 1996). The QSC is
responsible for the domestic marketing and export of 100 percent of the raw sugar produced in the
state of Queensland, which produces 95 percent of the sugar produced in Australia. The QSC supports
domestic producers through buyer-seller arrangements, marketing quotas, dual pricing arrangements,
and other quasi-government mechanisms that isolate domestic producers from foreign competition.
State trading enterprises (STEs) were not included in the URA. Other countries, including China and
India, handle their sugar trade through STEs similar to the QSC. 
Major Issues in the 2000 Round of the WTO Negotiations
Issues related to the U.S. sugar industry for the 2000 Round of the WTO agricultural trade
negotiations include further reduction in internal supports and export subsidies, state trading enterprises,
and agricultural biotechnology. These issues are not unique to the U.S. sugar industry but are fairly
common for most agricultural commodities produced in the United States. Issues more directly related
to the U.S. sugar industry are expected changes in U.S. sugar programs and policies, mainly loan rates
and TRQs. 
Internal Support and Export Subsidies
Although WTO members have made commitments to reduce internal supports and export
subsidies, levels of these subsidies differ among countries. For instance, the EU’s internal supports
(producer support prices) for sugarbeet growers are about 30 percent higher than those in the United
States (Table 3). Although the EU will reduce its subsidies on the basis of the committed schedule, the
EU’s export subsidies will remain at about 18 cents per pound in 2000/01, and subsidized exports will
remain at 1.3 million tons (Table 4). These subsidies have stimulated sugar production in the region and
lowered sugar prices in the world market.10
Table 3.  U.S.-EU Sugar Policy Comparison
Item United States European Union
Trade Status Net importer World’s largest exporter
Producer Support Price
(refined sugar) 22.90¢/lb 30-31¢/lba





(refined sugar) 41¢/lb 61¢/lb
Producer Tax on All Sugar
Marketed $41 million/yrc No
Export Subsidies No Yes
Production or Marketing
Controls on Sugar No Yes






National Aids to Producersd No Yes
Refiner Subsidies No Yes
Subsidy for Nonfood Uses of
Sugar No Yes
a Weighted average of “A,” “B,” and “C” quotas; dollar value rises with exchange rates.
b LMC International, World Retail Sugar Price Survey, June 1997.
c Projected revenues of $288 million during 1996/97–2002/03 for federal deficit reduction.
d Italy and Spain pay their producers additional subsidies.
Source:  Landell Mills Commodities, U.S. and EU Sugar Policy Comparison,1997.11







 1996/97 1,499.2 686.3
1997/98 1,442.7 639.5
1998/99 1,386.3 592.7
 1999/00 1,329.9 545.9
 2000/01 1,273.5 499.1
                                 Source:  European Communities, Schedule CXL: 
                                               Part IV Agricultural Products, 1995.
State Trading 
Many countries, including Australia and China, use STEs for sugar trade. As an example, the
QSC in Australia handles 100 percent of sugar exports by that country (Boston Consulting Group
1996). It practices price discrimination and receives various subsidies from the government.
  State trading will likely be an important issue in the 2000 Round of the WTO negotiations,
primarily because STEs have the capacity to distort trade flows (Ingco and Ng 1998). Although  the
agenda of the 2000 Round of the WTO negotiations is uncertain with respect to STEs, it is clear that
restrictions on STE operations will be needed to promote fair trade.
Biotechnology
Agricultural biotechnology has significant potential for consumers and producers. Genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) are a leading edge of this technology; examples of GMOs include
sugarbeets, corn, and soybeans that are insect resistant and herbicide tolerant. The GMOs also may
increase sugar content in beets. However, GMO beets have not yet been produced in the United States
mainly because of expected import restrictions on beet pulp produced from GMO sugarbeets in major
foreign markets, including the EU and Japan. In 1998, the U.S. sugarbeet industry exported 555
thousand tons of beet pulp at $124 per ton, mainly to the EU and Japan (USDA-ERS 1998).
Differences in GMO regulations across countries pose potential barriers to exports. Clearly there is a
need for harmonization of existing regulations among countries or negotiation of an international
standard (Normile and Simone 1999).12
Expected Changes in U.S. Sugar Programs and Policies 
The 2000 Round of the WTO agricultural trade negotiations may require TRQs to be
converted to a tariff system. If the United States converts TRQs to tariffs and reduces the tariffs
gradually, U.S. imports of sugar will also gradually increase. As a result, the U.S. domestic sugar price
may fall and also may become more volatile. Even if the United States is able to maintain its TRQ on
sugar, the United States might have to raise its quota over the given time period and lower its second-
tier duty, implying that more sugar would be imported into the United States. In addition, the United
States would import more sugar from Mexico under NAFTA. The increased sugar imports may result
in lower sugar prices in the United States.
World Sugar Simulation Model for Free Trade Scenarios
A major concern is what is going to happen in the world sugar industry if the U.S. government
and/or the EU eliminate the sugar programs, mainly loan rates and TRQs in the United States and
domestic and export subsidies in the EU, while other countries maintain their subsidies. There is strong
opposition to the U.S. sugar program from food processors and consumers, and the elimination of the
sugar program has been debated publicly for the last decade. A global sugar simulation model
developed by Benirschka, Koo, and Lou (1996) was used to address this question.
Econometric Simulation Model
The global sugar policy simulation model was developed by dividing sugar into beet and cane
sugar. This model includes 17 sugar producing and consuming countries. Some of these countries are
beet sugar producing countries (Algeria, Canada, the EU, and FSU) and some are cane sugar
producing countries (Australia, Brazil, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Thailand).
The remaining countries (China, Egypt, Japan, and the United States) produce both beet and cane
sugar. These two sugars are perfectly substitutable in consumption, but are differentiated in the
production process. Sugarcane is produced in tropical and subtropical climate zones. Once the cane is
harvested, the sucrose starts breaking down. Thus, to minimize transport costs and sucrose losses,
sugarcane mills are located close to cane fields. Mills convert sugarcane into raw sugar that is shipped
to refineries for further processing into refined sugar. On the other hand, sugarbeets are produced in
temperate climate zones. Since sugarbeets are bulky and costly to transport, beet processing facilities
are located near the fields.
Sugar production, consumption, and carry-over stock equations in major producing and
consuming countries are estimated with time series data by using econometric techniques. The estimated
equations are linked under a partial equilibrium condition in the world sugar industry (Figure 7). The
market clearing condition requires that the sum of all countries’ excess demand  for sugar, which
depends on the world price of sugar, is zero. This aggregate excess demand equation is solved for the


















Figure 7. Conceptual Sugar Model
clearing14
Sugar Supply
Area and yield equations determine the supply of sugar. Since sugar is divided into two classes
(cane sugar and beet sugar), two separate supply equations are estimated in the United States, Egypt,
Japan, and China, where both sugar classes are produced. Thus, these countries have behavioral
equations for one sugar class which they largely produce under an assumption that the two sugar
classes are not substitutable in production and consumption in the countries.  
Sugar area depends upon expected prices of sugar and alternative crops. As a proxy for price
expectations, lagged prices are used in the area equation. In addition to commodity prices, the lagged
area variable is included to capture dynamics associated with producers’ planting decisions. Area













as =  the sugar area harvested
ps =  the world market price or domestic price of sugar
pc =  the price of alternative crops
g =  policy parameters
i =  index for sugar type (i=1 for cane sugar and i=2 for beet sugar)
Since sugarcane and sugarbeets are not competing directly for land, area of each type is a
function of price of the corresponding crop. Competing crops are cotton in sugarcane producing
regions and wheat, barley, and oilseed crops in sugarbeet producing regions.







ys =  sugar yield per hectare
t  = a time trend representing technology.











i,t ’ the quantity of sugar produced15
Sugar Demand
Demand for sugar comprises food and industrial uses for domestic demand, carry-out stocks,
and net exports. Domestic demand and carry-out stock equations are estimated with time series data,
while net exports are the difference between domestic demand and supply.
Per capita sugar consumption is a function of the price of sugar, income, and a time trend






Total consumption of sugar is calculated by multiplying the per capita consumption by







fd = demand for food
qd= the total demand for sugar
cy = per capita income
pop= population
Carry-out Stocks
Carry-out stocks are a precaution against unexpected shortfalls in production. These stocks,
therefore, are likely related to the level of domestic production. However, since the opportunity cost of
holding sugar stocks depends on the price of sugar, the stocks should respond to price changes.










where qss = carry-out stocks.
Net Export












where  qxs = the net export of sugar. 
If net exports are negative, the country is a net importer. 16
Price Linkage










pms,n = import price of sugar in country n
pms,w
= world price of sugar
ern = exchange rate of country n






i,t @ (1 % b s,n) % t s,n
where
 pds,n  = domestic price of sugar paid by consumers in country n
b = an ad valorem tariff
t = specific tariff






where pws,n = wholesale price of sugar in country n.







where pfs,n = price of sugar received by farmers in country n.
Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium implies that the total supply equals total demand, indicating that the sum






i,t ’ 0 i ’ 1,217
The equilibrium condition is solved to determine market clearing prices of sugar. For the
countries which have import commitments under the UR agreement, their actual import commitments
are used in the above equations when their imports are less than the commitments.  
Assumptions and Data Collection
Base projections of this global sugar simulation model is grounded on a series of assumptions
about general economy, agricultural policies, and technological changes in exporting and importing
countries. Macro assumptions are based on forecasts prepared by WEFA group and Project Link.
Some of the macro variables are GDP growth rates, interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation rates in
the countries. It is generally assumed that current agricultural policy will be continued in all countries.
Average weather conditions and historical rates of technological change are assumed to prevail during
the projection period. The prices of sugar in individual countries and the world market are endogenous,
while the prices of other crops are exogenous. Thus, the baseline projection of the model is based on
the forecasted world prices of other crops which have substitute and complementary relationships with
sugarbeets and sugarcane. The forecasted prices were obtained from the Food and Agricultural Policy
Institute (FAPRI) baseline solution.  
Alternative Scenarios
Alternative scenarios are developed on the basis of possible policy changes in the United States
and the EU. The scenarios are:
1. The United States eliminates its import restrictions on sugar for the 2001 to 2004 period and
maintains its trade embargo on Cuba, while other countries maintain their subsidies and import
restricting programs.
2. The United States eliminates its import restrictions on sugar for the 2001 to 2004 period and
allows trade with Cuba, while other countries maintain their subsidies and import restricting
programs.
3. Both the United States and the EU eliminate import restrictions and subsidies, respectively, for
the 2001 to 2004 period, and other countries maintain their subsidies and import restricting
programs.
The results from these alternative scenarios are compared with those from the base scenarios to
evaluate impacts of the stated policy changes on the U.S. sugar industry. 18
U.S. Sugar Industry under the Base and Alternative Trade Policies
In the base scenario, sugar production in the United States is expected to increase about 4.2 
percent for beet sugar and 3.2 percent for cane sugar during the 2001 to 2004 period (Table 5).
However, sugar consumption in the United States is expected to increase about 4.4 percent, which is
slightly larger than production. As a result, U.S. imports of sugar are projected to increase 5.4 percent
in this time period. Figure 8 shows beet and sugar production and consumption for the 1990-2004
period in the base scenario. As indicated above, sugar consumption will increase faster than both beet
and cane sugar production, resulting in increases in imports.
Caribbean price of sugar is expected to increase 21 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period in the
base scenario (Table 5). However, the U.S. domestic wholesale price of sugar is expected to increase
only 6.1 percent for the same time period (Figure 9). This is mainly because the U.S. government
increases its imports to stabilize the domestic price of sugar. 
Table 5. Sugar Price, Production, Consumption, and Imports under the Base and Trade
Liberalization Scenarios in the United States                                    
  1999                                                            2004                                                                
 Actual           Base                            Liberalization in the U.S.                  Liberalization
                         No Trade                Open Trade             U.S. and EU 
          With Cuba                With Cuba                                       
Production 
  Beet Sugar 1,000 ton 4,577.3 4,768.2  (4.2%) 3,733  (-18.3%) 3,668  (-19.7%) 4,135  (-9.4%)
  Cane Sugar 1,000 ton 3,428.1 3,536.8  (3.2%) 2,956  (-13.8%) 2,914  (-15.5%) 3,216  (-6.2%)
Consumption  1,000 ton 10,083.1 10,518.8  (4.3%) 11,426  (12.7%) 11,494  (14.0%) 10,947  (7.9%)
Imports 1,000 ton 2,190.9 2,308.8  (5.4%) 4,772  (117.8%) 4,948 (125.8%) 3.616  (65.1%)
Price         
  Sugarbeets $/ton 38.45 39.74  (3.4%) 29.02  (-23.7%) 28.23  (-25.4%) 34.69  (-8.3%)
  Sugarcane $/ton 27.11 28.23  (4.1%) 18.86  (-29.0%) 18.16  (-31.6%) 23.82  (-10.3%)
  Caribbean cents/lbs 9.43 11.45  (21.4%) 12.53  (36.7%) 12.06  (32.2%) 15.86  (68.2%)
  Import cents/lbs 21.25 22.60  (6.4%) 15.03  (-29.3%) 14.47  (-31.9%) 19.03   (-10.4%)
  Wholesale cents/lbs 23.28 24.70  (6.1%) 16.75  (-28.0%) 16.17  (-30.6%) 20.95  (-10.0%)
  Retail cents/lbs 35.74 37.66  (5.4%) 26.89  (-24.8%) 26.09  (-27.0%) 32.58  (-8.8%)
Parenthesis show change from actual.19
















Figure 8.  Beet and Cane Sugar Production and Consumption under the Base Scenario,
                1990-2004.
Elimination of Import Restrictions and the Loan Program in the United States
Under the U.S. trade liberalization scenario in which the United States eliminates its import
restrictions while other countries maintain their sugar programs (Scenario 1), the Caribbean price of
sugar is expected to increase about 36 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period because increased U.S.
imports of sugar raise demand for sugar in the world market. At the same time, the U.S. wholesale
price decreases 28 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period because increased imports raise the supply of
sugar in the United States. When the United States includes Cuba as a trading partner in the same
scenario (Scenario 2), the Caribbean price of sugar increases only 32 percent and U.S. wholesale price
decreases 30.6 percent. This is mainly because Cuba can supply large amounts of sugar to the United
States at shipping costs lower than any other off-shore origins. Figure 9 shows annual movements of
both Caribbean and U.S. domestic wholesale sugar prices for the 1990-2004 period under the U.S.
trade liberalization scenario with and without trade with Cuba. 20




























Figure 9.  Caribbean and U.S. Domestic Wholesale Price of Sugar under the Base and































Under the trade liberalization scenario with no imports from Cuba, U.S. sugar production is
expected to decrease for the 2001 to 2004 period (18.3 percent reduction for beet sugar and 13.8
percent reduction for cane sugar) and consumption is expected to increase about 12.7 percent (Figure
10). When the United States starts to import sugar from Cuba under the trade liberalization scenario,
production of sugar decreases further due to reduction in the domestic price of sugar, and consumption
of sugar increases  more than under the scenario with no import from Cuba. Since Cuba is a major
sugar producing country in the world, trade liberalization with Cuba tends to increase imports from
Cuba, resulting in further reductions in sugar production and increases in sugar consumption. U.S. sugar
imports would increase 118 percent under the U.S. trade liberalization scenario with no imports from
Cuba and 126 percent under the same scenario with imports from Cuba. 
Figure 10.  Beet and Cane Sugar Production and Consumption under the U.S. Trade
                  Liberalization Scenario
Elimination of Domestic Programs and Trade Liberalization in the United States and the EU
When both the United States and the EU liberalize their sugar trade (Scenario 3), the
Caribbean price of sugar is expected to increase 68 percent from 9.45 cents in 1999 to 15.86 cents
per pound in 2004 (Figure 9). This is mainly because under this scenario, (1) sugar production in the
EU decreases substantially and the EU starts to import sugar and (2) the United States also increases
its sugar imports, resulting in the increased demand for sugar in the world market. The U.S. wholesale
price of sugar decreases only 10 percent for the 2001 to 2004 period under this scenario.22
















Sugar production is reduced 9.4 percent for beet sugar and 6.2 percent for cane sugar, which is
much smaller than under the other scenarios (Figure 11). Sugar consumption would increase 7.9
percent. As a result, sugar imports would increase 65 percent which is much smaller than under the
other scenarios. This implies that impacts on the U.S. sugar industry are minimal if both the United
States and the EU liberalize their sugar policies.
Figure 11.  Beet and Cane Sugar Production and Consumption under the U.S. and EU Trade
                  Liberalization Scenario
Regional Competitiveness
Figure 12 shows production and processing costs of refined sugar in major U.S. sugar
producing regions. Production and processing costs are the highest in Hawaii, followed by Texas
(McElroy and Ali 1995). Cane sugar producing regions have higher production and processing costs
than most beet sugar producing regions, except in Florida. Production and processing costs in Florida
are similar to those in beet sugar producing regions. The Red River Valley has the lowest production
and processing costs in the United States, followed by the Northwest. These two regions appear to






















































































Liberalization, U.S. and EU
Liberalization, U.S.
20.95 cents/lb
Figure 12. Break-even Point for North American Sugar Producing Regions
Source:  USDA-ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook, various issues.
At a market price of 24.7 cents per pound, all areas except Hawaii are covering production
and processing costs. When the price is lowered to 20.95 cents per pound under the trade liberalization
scenario in both the United States and the EU, Louisiana, Texas, and Hawaii are not covering their
costs, indicating that these three regions may not be able to sustain their sugar production. When the
price is lowered to 16.75 cents per pound under the free trade scenario in the United States, no sugar
producing regions in the United States are covering their  production and processing costs at current
asset values. 
This implies that most sugar producing regions may be able to survive at current costs and asset
values if both the United States and the EU liberalize their sugar trade, while sugar subsidies remain in
other countries. However, if only the United States eliminates its sugar programs, all U.S. sugar
producing regions would be threatened.  24
Concluding Remarks
The U.S. sugar industry has been protected by the U.S. sugar program in the 1996 FAIR Act
and the TRQ under the URA. As a result, the domestic sugar price is about 23 cents, whereas the
world sugar price is 9 cents per pound. Of concern is what the U.S. sugar industry will face with the
expected changes in the U.S. sugar programs in the 2000 Round of the WTO negotiations on
agriculture. 
Aside from addressing further reductions in subsidies, the 2000 Round of the WTO
negotiations will likely deal with issues involving the restriction of activities of STEs and the
standardization of  regulations on biotechnology. Progress on these issues will lead to further
liberalization of world sugar trade and will have significant impacts on the U.S. sugar industry in the near
future.
The United States may not be able to maintain the TRQs on sugar. The new WTO negotiations
may require member countries to convert TRQs to a tariff system and to reduce the tariff rates over the
given period. Even if the United States is able to maintain its TRQ on sugar, the United States will likely
be expected to raise its quota on sugar and lower its second-tier duties over the given period. In
addition, Mexico has the potential to export sugar to the United States under NAFTA. The United
States will likely import much more sugar and, consequently, the U.S. domestic sugar price will likely
fall.
The U.S. sugarbeet industry is more cost efficient than the sugarcane industry. Florida is the
most competitive sugarcane producing region. The Red River Valley is most competitive in producing
beet sugar. Most sugarbeet producing regions and Florida will remain competitive, at current costs and
asset values, if the domestic price decreases to 20.95 cents per pound as a result of the elimination of
the sugar programs in the United States and the EU. However, if only the United States eliminates its
sugar programs, all U.S. sugar producing regions would be threatened.25
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